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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study proposed that guilt proneness and anxiety proneness 
are best regarded as separate constructs, and that they differ in their 
relationships 'With field independence, locus of control, empatey, and 
religiosity. Furthermore, it attempted to integrate the concept of 
guilt proneness into a 'Wider theoretical network for each sex. 
Gull t is regarded as a sig:nificant aspect of life by various 
disciplines, e.g., contemporary literature (Brown, 1973}, existential 
philosophy (Morano, 1973), theology and religion (McConahay & Hough, 
1973)· In psychology, guilt has frequently been considered as undesirable: 
as the bitter price paid for conmrunity living (Freud, 1930), or as a 
neurotic symptom (Campbell, 1975). Recently two trends have developed: 
first several authors have suggested that guilt can have a constructive 
effect b.r ooti.vating desirable changes in behavior or b.r increasing one's 
sensitivity to others (Campbell, 1975; Hoffman, 1970; ~nrdnger, 1973; 
Mowrer, ·1966); second, empirical. research a rout guilt has been sti.mula. ted 
by the development of psychometrica.J.J..y sound instruments {Cattell, 1973; 
Evans, Jessup, & Hearn, 1975; Mosher, 1966, 1968; Otterbacher & Munz, 
\ 
1973). 
When considered as a constructive influence, guilt is probably 
better conceptualized not in psychoanalytic terms as a derivative of the 
oedipal problem, but as one aspect of mora1 development within the contexi 
1 
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of total personality development. In this approach moral responses 
(including guilt), which originally developed out of fear associated with 
atte:q>ts to obtain certain satisfactions, may continue to exist for quite 
different reasons. Secondly, this approach provides a better theoretical 
framework for understanding the rational formation and reappraisal of 
moral values and behavior during adolescence and adulthood (Bieber, 1972; 
Erlkson, 1964; Hartman, 196o). Several persona.li ty characteristics seem 
to be especially relevant to the development and functi.oning of moral 
understanding, namely, field independence (Witkin, Dyk, Faterson, 
Goodenough, & Karp, 1962}, locus of control (Rotter, 1966), empathy 
(Hogan, 1969), and religiosity (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975). At the same 
time, guilt is often discussed in terms of, or in relation to, anxiety. 
The present study examined the relationship of guilt pronenes~~~ 
(Mosher, 1966, 1968) and anxiety proneness (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & 
Lushene, 1970) to these personality characteristics. It proposed that 
guilt proneness and anxiety proneness cli.ffer from each other, and differ 
in their relationships to the personality variables. The investigation 
of sex differences is included not because women may be more guilt prone 
than men (Heying, Korabik, & Mlmz, 1975), but because they differ on the 
other personality variables and, possibly, on previous conditioning 
regarding apecific moral issues. For example, women may be more 
stringently controlled by external norms {Heying & Munz, 1974) • Hence, 
it is not clear whether the other personality variables included here 
are related to guilt in the same way for men and women. The personality 
variables an4 several hypotheses are discussed in the following section. 
CHAPTER II 
REV!Pli OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Guilt 
Several prelimi.nary notions may help to clarify the meaning of 
guilt proneness, its definition, and relationship to other forms or 
anxiety. 
fust, guilt has 'been considered previously from variollS 
perspect1.ves, frequently with some degree of arbitrariness, and usually 
in terms or resistance to temptation, self-criticism, remorse after 
transgression, confession, expiation, and/or punishment. Second, guilt 
is ordinarily considered objective if' it follows actual or intended 
wrongdoing; neurotic if it genera.lly follows the mere thought or fantasy 
about wrongdoing; existential if it refiects a sense of' cosmic dispro-
portion between what is and what ought to be. Third, guilt is considered 
a form of moral anxiety, a regulating force, a superego style; in this 
it is similar to shame (Lewis, 1971). However, guilt is said to differ 
from shame for several reasons: guilt involves a conflict between the ego 
and the superego, whereas shame involves a conflict between the ego and 
the ego-ideal (Piers & Singer, 1953); also, guilt illV'olves internal. 
sanctions, whereas shame is a response to external sanctions alone 
\ 
(Ausubel, 1955); finally, guilt and shame are related to empirically 
differentiated a~tive styles (lewis, 1971; Smith, 1972). 
' Fourth, guilt can be measured in a global way, i.e., total guilt 
3 . 
4 
feelings across several different situations, or in a specific wa:y, 
i.e., guilt over particular issues. Mosher (1966, 1968) differentiated 
specific areas of guilt, namely, sex, aggression, and morality-conscience. 
Others indicate that a global measure is rot theoretically useful (Fiske, 
1971) and lacks empirical support (Mi.schel, 1974). Within specific 
content areas there is a further question aoout the relationship between 
resistance to temptation and reoorse after transgression. Psychoanalytic 
theory suggests a positive relationship based on the notion that 
resistance is motivated by the desire to avoid the pain of guilt. How-
ever, only slight suppo:rt has been found for this relationship (Becker, 
1964; Johnson, Ackerman, & Frank, 1968). Hoffman's (1970) theory of 
"dynamic consistency" may provide some clarification, suggesting that 
resistance and remorse {as typifying the post-transgression reaction) ·-
are positively related only in regard to a specific content area and 
only at a certain level of maturity. The present writer suggests that 
this may not result until the end of adolescence, perhaps due to a 
particular kind of stabtlization (Kohl berg & Kramer, 1969). 
Fif'th, a meaningful distinction can be made between state guilt, 
i.e., the transitory feeling of the moment, and trait guilt, i.e., a 
relatively stable disposition or tendency to respond in a certain way. 
Spielberger (1966, l972a) has summarized ~he value of this distinction 
in the stuqy of anxiety. Mosher (1968) and Okel and·l~sher (1968) made 
a similar distinction regarding guilt. In particular, they described 
trait guilt as an acquired di.sposi tion to avoid gutl t-inducing behaviors 
or to respond to committed transgressions with state guilt. M:>sher 
includes both resistance and remorse in accord with psychoanalytic theory. 
----------~-------~------~-
Without del:a.ting the theory, the same combination seems feasible in 
terms of Hoffman's (1970) theory of dynamic consistency. Otterbacher 
and Munz (1973) also developed measures of state and trait guilt, 
describing the latter as a generalized self-concept derived from the 
subjective averaging of the individual's perception of his guilt states. 
lbsber focuses on a cognitive aspect of trait guilt, while Otterbacher 
and Munz focus on an affective aspect. Jbth constructs have some 
validity; however, Janda and Magri (1975) fomd no empirical relation-
ship beween them and concluded that they are independent aspects of 
trait guilt. 
FinaJ.ly, since the ti.Ina of Freud (1930) , guilt has been discussed 
in relation to anxiety (fear). This relationship bas 'teen explained in 
various ways, not always with a great deal of clarity. Perhaps a brief' 
description of' several theoretical posi tiona regarding guilt and anxiety 
as states can provide a background f'or discussing their relationship as 
traits. According to Mandler and Watson (1966) guUt and anxiety are 
basically the same because they involve the interruption of' an organized 
response sequence without offering an alternative; however, they are 
given different labels because they arise in different situations. 
".Anxious guilt" results when one's continuing efforts to right (i.e., 
un-do) a wrong are interrupted, but no alternatives are available; as a 
result the individual is left feeling helpless. Izard (1972) concep-
tualizes anxiety as a pattern of emotions, as an unstable and variable 
combination of interacting fundamental emotions (e.g., fear, anger, 
guilt, distress). Guilt is mt the same as fear, but occurs only as a 
component of a larger anxiety pattern, in which fear is always domtnant. 
6 
Freud described both the origin and continuing experience of guilt as 
based on fear. At first, there is fear of parental punishment and of 
losing parental love; later, fear of a critical and punishing superego 
develops, as well as fear of the larger society which takes the place 
of the parents. Final.l.y, other authors col'lBider guilt and anxiety as 
different constructs, but suggest that they are frequently found to-
gather. This occurs because the laboratory or real-life situation, 
which involves guilt over wrongdoing, also includES either a further threat 
to the integrity of the self-concept ('Epstein, 1972) or the added 
uncertainty of external. punishment (Gardner, 1970); the latter dimensions 
occasion the anxiety. 
Some of the difficulty in defining and differentiating guilt and 
.. ._...,. ~. 
anxiety as states is also apparent in their analysis as traits. Previous 
research has been conflicting, but tends to support a distinction between 
guilt proneness and anxiety proneness. Lowe (1964) , using the Taylor 
Manifest Anxiety Scale and a similar MMPI-based guilt scale, found a very 
high correlation and concluded that the two col'l5tructs, as measured by' 
self-report, are equivalent. Levitt (1967) concluded in his brief review 
that the anxious personal.ity is much given to guilt. Cattell and Scheier 
(1961) found that "guilt proneness" loaded on trait anxiety. However, 
contrary to the Freudian view, a "strong superego 11 was not related to 
anxiety among normal subjects, even though it might be related among 
maladjusted patients. Note that "guilt proneness" is understood not as 
a liability to pangs of guilt, but as a global sel'l5e of inadequacy, 
loneliness, and tears (Cattell, 1973). Finally, M>sher (1966) found that 
among male subjects trait anxiety, measured by' the Manifest Anxiety Scale, 
was not related to his measure of total guilt, nor to specific measures of 
7 
hostility guilt or morality-conscience guilt; although it was related 
negatively to a specific measure or sex guilt. Later a positive 
relationship was round between hostility guilt and anxi.ety measured by 
the Welsh .Anxiety subscale of' the MMPI (Knott, Lasater, & Shuman, 1974). 
In summa:ry, trait guilt and trait anxiety are described in three 
different ways: as equivalent, as positively related, and as independent. 
Although IDwe's (1964) measure or guilt is relatively unknown, Cattell 
(1973), Mosher (1966) and Knott et al. (1974) indicated that the picture 
is not clear, at least among male subjects. The ab:Jenoe or a relation-
ship between anxiety and total guilt becomes rather meaningless if sex 
guilt and hostility guilt are round related in opposite ways to anxiety. 
The positive relationship between Cattell's (1973) "guilt proneness" and 
trai. t anxiety is not nurprising, and does not contradict the previous 
statement. The interpretation or that scale, together with evidence 
that it loads with abasement on a !actor independent or trait guilt 
(Schwartz, 1973), suggests that "guilt proneness" may not focus on moral 
guilt. 
In view or the preceding discussion, the present study was 
concerned with an objective understanding or guilt, conceptualized as a 
disposition within specific content areas roth to resist temptation or, 
after transgression, to engage in sell-criticism, remorse, confession, or 
expiation (Mosher, 1966, 1968). The terms trait guilt and guilt proneness 
were considered synoeymous. Guilt proneness was operationally defined by 
the MOsher Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory, which includes separate forms 
for men and women, and provides a score for total guilt, as well as for 
sex guilt, hostility guilt, and morality-conscience guilt. 
p 
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The uncertain relationship between trait guilt and trait anxiety 
in the previous studies, which did not include a female sample, indicates 
the need f'or further clarification. The present stuey- examined the 
relationship between trait guilt and trait anxiety (Spielberger et al., 
1970) with male and female subjects. Trait anxiety refers to relatively 
stable individual differences in anxiety proneness. It was considered 
as an acquired predisposition both to view the world in a particular 
way and to respond in situations perceived as threatening with conscious 
feelings of' tension and apprehension, and with heightened autonomic 
nervous system activity. Spielberger's (1972b) theory suggests that 
subjects high on trait anxiety are more self-depreciating, perceive a 
wider range o:r situations as threatening, and become particularly 
apprehensive in situations that involve failure or loss of' self-esteem. 
Conceivably, such individuals may experience increased state anxiety 
when confronted with a temptation or moral transgression; perhaps they 
tend to develop a chronic sense of' guilt which borders on the neurotic; 
however, they do not seem likely to score very high on a cognitive 
'--
measure of trait guilt. At the same time, as Erlkson (1964) noted, the 
mature "ethical'' sense presupposes an earlier mrality which was based 
on fear of' threats (including both punishment and the inner sense of' 
guilt). Some residual effects of this morality may still be operative. 
It was eypothesized that trait guilt and trait anxiety are 
different constructs, being either statistically independent or only 
slightly related. Secondly, since increased sexual arousal is accompanied 
by increased anxiety in female (Mosher & Greenberg, 1969) but not in male 
subjects (Schill, 1972a), it was hypothesized that anxiety and sex guilt 
... 
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are positively related among female but not among male subjects. Other 
relationships and sex differences were also explored. 
At the same time, certain individuals are considered to be IOOre 
guilt prone than others (Izard, 1972; Snith, 1972). This does not mean 
that the latter individuals would necessarily be involved in IOOre immoral. 
behavior, but that they have different reasons, e.g., shame or .fear, for 
resisting temptation or feeling unpleasant after transgression. 
P!lcbologica1 Differentiation 
Witkin and his colleagues (Witkin et al., 1962; Witkin, Oltman, 
Raskin, & Karp, 1971) conceptualize psychological differentiation as a 
single 1mderlying process of development toward greater psychologica.~ 
complexity. lbre basic and more pervasive than a cognitive style, th~..:: 
level of differentiation is an influential determinant in tnal.G" areas, 
e.g., perception, cognition, body concept, sense of separate identity, 
and nature of defenses. 
The theory rests upon voluminous research which began in the 
area of spatial perception (Witkin, Lewis, Hertzman, Ma.cbover, Meissner, 
& Wapner, 1954) on tasks that required the disembedding of an element 
.from its surrounding field. Those dominated by the organization of the 
field and perceiving the parts of the field as fused are said to perceive 
in a field-dependent way. Those experienoing the parts of the field as 
discrete from the organized ground are said to perceive in a field-
independent way. AB a result of research in other areas the field-
dependent approach is described as diffuse, global, and dominated b,r the 
field, whereas the field-independent approach is describe~ as detailed, 
articulate, and ing?osing structure. Eventually these differences were 
10 
encompassed within the construct of differentiation which represents a. 
developmental continuum characterized by increasing specialization. 
Witkin et al. (1971) summarized their position as follows: 
Thus we consider it more differentiated if, in his perception 
of the world, the person perceives parts of the field as 
discrete and the field as structured • • • if, in his concept 
of his body, the person has a definite sense of the boundaries 
of the body and the interrelation among its parts ••• if the 
person has a feeling of himself as an individual distinct from 
others and bas internalized, developed standards to guide his 
view of the world and of himself • • • if the defenses the 
person uses are specialized. It is reasonable to believe that 
these various characteristics, which we have found to cluster 
together, are not the end products of development in separate 
channels, but are diverse expressions of an underlying process 
of development toward greater psychological complexity. 
(p. 9-10) 
Despite problems al::out the meaning of differentiation (Nisbett 
& Temoshok, 1976; Wachtel, 1972), about the single (Ada.ms, 1974; l'Tit~ . 
& Berry, 1975) or multiple (Bergman & :Ehglebrektson, 1973) factor 
structure of the rod-and-frame test or the em'tedded figures test, and 
about the adequacy of certain measures (.Arbuthnot, 1972), the theory has 
stimulated an immense amount of research and SJ~Uthesized a wide range of 
data. This includes several important aspects of moral development: 
internalization of principles (Witkin et al., 1962), moral reasoning 
(.Arbuthnot, 1974; Schleifer & Douglas, 1973), role playing (Fu.tterer, 
1973), and empathy (Martin & Toomey, 1973). In particular, the theory 
makes certain predictions, which have received some support, about shame, 
guilt, and anxiety (Lewis, 1971; Witkin et aJ.., 1962; Witkin, Lewis, & 
WeU, 1968). 
First, there are s~ilarities between field-independent 
functioni.ng and the experience of guilt. The field-independent individual 
is more capable than the field-dependent of disembedding himself from 
11 
his surroundings (including other persons), of using internalized 
standards to evaluate himself rather than looking to others for approval 
and evaluation (Pearson, 1972; Willoughby, 1967) 1 of separating his 
thoughts from his feelings, of experiencing articulated rather than 
global affect. Guilt, in turn, involves internal standards rather than 
comparisons with the standards and expectations of others 1 considers 
self the judge rather than real or imagined others, requires a more 
ideational focus on the specific act and making amends rather than a 
diffuse focus on the whole self as 'being inferior or ashamed (Witkin 
et al. t 1968). In view or these similarities, field-independent 
individuals seem to be more guilt prone than field-dependent individuals. 
Witkin et al. (1968) found some support for this relationship in 
their study or the affective reactions, i.e., state guilt, of eight 
neurotic patients during the first two sessions of psychotherapy. How-
ever, these results may 'be 1imi ted to the therapeutic situation, to the 
first few sessions of therapy, or to neurotic subjects. Therefore, 
further research with normal subjects is indicated. 
Second, Witkin et al. (1962) originally presented some evidence 
that the less structured defense system or the field-dependent person 
would lead to greater expression of anxiety. However, a later study 
conf'irmed an apparently different hypothesis 1 namely, that field-
independent and field-dependent patients would not differ regarding the 
total amount or anxiety expressed, but that field-dependent patients 
would express more diffuse anxiety, because or th8 global quality of 
their atrecti ve experience (vli tkin et al., 1968). Other studies with 
12-year-old and adult subjects of both sexes failed to find a relation-
ship between the Hidden Figures Test and ti."'' measures or anxiety, the 
jiiP 
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Manifest Anxiet,y Scale and the Institute for Personalit.1 and Abilit,y 
Testing Anxi.et,y Sca1e (Dargel & Kirk, 1973; Joshi, 1974). Hence, there 
seems to be no relationship between field independence and trait anxiety, 
and a negative relationship between field independence and the expression 
ot diffuse anxiety. 
In the present study', therefore, it was cypothesized that guilt 
and anxiety are related to field independence in different ways among 
normal subjects: Field independence is positively related to trait guilt, 
and either negatively related to, or independent of, trait anxiety. 
The scope of differentiation theory necessitates the study of 
other variables that may moderate the relationship with gutlt and 
anxiety. Two such variables are locus or control and empathy. Each has 
-.~ 
been discussed in relation to field independence and both appear to be 
related to guilt and anxiety. 
!Deus or Control 
Szasz (197.3) and l~enninger (1973) described a tendency or some 
individuals ro explain away the reality of evil, the fact of man's 
inhumanity to man. These persons are said to blame external. forces--
the devil, mental illness, whatever--ro avoid accepting personal 
responsibility and its concomitant obligation of asserting as much 
rational control as possible (Pittel, 1960). These authors present no 
empirica1 evidence; however, there seem to be similarities between their 
ideas and some ot the research connected w:i.. th locus of control. 
According to Rotter (1966) people differ in the degree to which 
they attribute positive or negative reinforcement to their own efforts 
or to outside forces. Internal control refers to the perception of 
13 
reinforcing events as consequences of one 's own behavior and, there by, 
under personal control. External control refers to the perception that 
events are 'Uili'elated to one 1 s behavior and, thus, beyond personal 
control. In Rotter 1 s theory of personality this belief or expectancy 
is an essential element in determining the probability of a particular 
behavior. This construct bas stimulated a great deal of research and 
its influence is recognized in a variety of situations (Lefcourt, 1966, 
1972}. 
There are direct and indirect reasons for suggesting that the 
notion of personal control, of felt effectiveness, is related to such· 
behavior as resistance to temptation and remorse, etc., after trans-
gression. First, among the indirect reasons, internals regard their 
behavior as the cause of certain consequences. They perceive a strongsr 
link between intention and outcome than externals do. For example, 
internals were found to assume greater responsibility for the consequences 
of their behavior (Phares, Wilson, & Klyver, 1971) and to engage in more 
self-blame after receiving negative evaluation than externals ch (Davis 
& Davis, 1972}. Secondly, locus of control does influence the attribution 
of responsibility for a "bad deed," at least in regard to others. Thus, 
Sosis (1974) fomd that internals hold a person more responsible and 
judge him more harshly for an accident than externals do. Externals, on 
the other hand, seem to believe that if people are not masters of their 
fate, then a person who commits a negative act is not necessarily 
responsible for the effects of that act. These studies, although not 
in the specific area of personal moral behavior, do emphasize the 
pertinent elements of placing responsibility and engaging in self-criticism. 
Thus, they indirectly suggest a relationship between locus of control and 
.... 
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guilt. 
Direct evidence for this relationship and the presence of a sex 
difference is indicated in three studies. Johnson et al. (1968) used 
separate global measures of resistance and remorse, which were based on 
eight projective stories, to test the hypothesis that internals are 
higher on resistance because of their greater tendency to delay 
gratification. They found male internals higher on resistance and on 
remorse, but found no relationship among female subjects. Adams-Webber 
(1969) used a global measwe of moral sanctions, which was based on two 
projective stories, to test the hypothesis that internals would emphasize 
self-blame and guilt feelings because these depend only on the individual's 
judgment and are directly contingent upon the inmoral act whereas externals 
.. ,~ ~· 
would emphasize detection and punishment, or even deny personal l:il.ame.- ~·In 
support of the J:zypothesis, highly significant differences were found 
between the sanctions described by internals and externals. However, he 
found no sex differences, noted the discrepancy with Johnson et al. 's 
stuey, and recommended further research to resolve the ambiguity. 
Finally, Schwartz (1973) with no specific hypothesis tested the "unclear" 
relationship between total guilt on the Mosher True-False Gull t Inventory 
and locus of control. He found a slight tendency for externals to be 
higher on guilt with a combined sample of male and female subjects. 
Schwartz's (1973) results do not fit the previous theoretica:L 
description or research. Inasmuch as Schwartz did not offer art3' comment 
or explanation, it remains unclear to the present writer why externals 
were higher on guilt. Possibly this is a case in which the generalized 
expectancy of locus of control is outweighed by a specific expectancy 
regarding the moral situation. That is, negative reinforcements related 
---
to immoral behavior may be so well learned that they have greater 
influence than locus of control. For this reason externals may score 
higher on a measure of conventional morality. 
The present study repeated Schwartz 1 s study, but also included 
specific measures of guilt and the necessary control for sex differences 
(Johnson et al., 1968). It was hypothesized that male internals score 
higher on total guilt than externals. No predictions were made aoout 
female subjects. 
In addition, several studies indicated that the combl.nation of 
differentiation and locus or control, which are statistically independent 
(Wcourt & Telegdi, 1971; Rotter, 1966; strahan & Huth, 1975), led to 
more precise predictions across several cognitive, perceptual, and 
personality 1n.easures (Lefcourt, Gronnerud, & l1cD:>nald, 1973; Tobacyk, = 
Broughton, & Vaught, 1975). Lefcourt and Telegdi suggested that certain 
combinations are congruent (i.e., field-independent internals, field-
dependent externals), while others are incongruent (i.e., field-independent 
externals, field-dependent internals) • The congruent groups performed more 
effective:cy on cognitive and perceptual tasks and were better adjusted 
according tD an actual-self/ideal-self Q-sort. This was particul.arly true 
of the field-independent internals. Tobaeyk et al. suggested further 
research to determine how pervasive a com"ai.ned 1'perceptual expectancr" 
style may be. The prese11t study, therefore, explored this style in 
relation to guilt. In view of the earlier discussion and the present 
notion of congruency, it was hypothesized that field-independent internals 
score higher on gull t than the ot.~er groups. 
Regarding anxiety, a number of studies indicated that externals 
are more anxious than internals, at least on measures such as the Manif'est 
p 
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Anxiet.Y Scale and the Institute for Personality and Ability Testing 
Anxiet,y Scale, apparently because they more often appraised the world as 
a place in which they cannot complete organized sequences of behavior 
(Watson, 1967) or lack control over reinforcing events (Id.chtenstein & 
Keutzer, 1967; Ray & Katahn, 1968; Strassberg, 1973). Others found no 
relationship between locus of control and a nonobtrusive measure of 
social anxiet,y (Donovan, Smith, Paige, & O'Leary, 1975). 
In the present study it was hypothesized that guilt and anxiety 
are related to locus of control in different ways: Internals are more 
prone to guilt than externals and externals are more prone to anxiety 
than internaJ.s. .Also, since field-independent internals show signs 
contraindicating anxiet,y, namely, higher cognitive performance and better 
adjustment, they were hypothesized to be less prone to anxiet.Y than ·tne 
other groups. 
Previous research indicated that predictions based on the Rotter 
I-E scale may be weak because the scale is multidimensional (Collins, 
1974; Joe, 1971; Klockars & Varnum, 1975; Mi.rels, 1970; Strahah & Ruth, 
1975; Viney, 1974). Mirels found two factors which are similar for male 
and female subjects: first, a belief concerning felt mastery over the 
course of one's life; second, a belief concerning the extent to which one 
is capable of exerting an impact on political institutions. Other 
investigations have found similar factors (Strahan & Ruth, 1975; Viney, 
1974). Presumably, Mtrels' first factor has greater relevance in the 
present stud¥. Its influence, therefore, is noted. 
l!S>atb;y 
Although differentiation refers to the overall complexit,r of the 
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psychological system and locus of control refers to a cognitive belief, 
empathy represents an affective dimension which is theoretically important 
and is related to guilt and anxiety in different ways. In general, empathy 
refers to an awareness and sensitivity regarding the needs and feelings of 
others, to an ability to "stand in the shoes of the other." Within a moral 
perspectt ve, empath;y refers to the consideration of the implications of 
one's behavior for others. 
Various theories incorporate the notion of empathy. Within a neo-
a.nalytic framework, Bieber (1972) emphasized the need to include compassion 
as a nonsuperego fu.TJ.ction but an essential element in moral man. Kohl berg 1 s 
(1969) stages or moral reasoning reflect an expanding capacity to take the 
role of the other. Hogan (1969, 1973) listed empathy as one of the f'ive 
dimensions necessary to explain moral development and conduct. Hoffman:: s 
(1970, 1973) theory rests ultimately upon the capacity to experience the 
inner states of others and to transform empathic distress into sympathetic 
concern for others. For Hoffman, guilt is sympathetic distress over 
another's distress, with the realization that one has .freely caused that 
distress. Fina.J.:cy, if altruism may be considered positive moral behavior, 
empathy is considered a major determinant in this area (Berkowitz, 1972; 
Krebs, 1975) • 
The empathic person focuses mt so much on moral rules and 
prohibitions, as on persons and how they are affected by his behavior. 
Perhaps empat.l'zy" specifies a particular kind of internal.ization, i.e., a 
felt understanding of what it is about certain actions that makes them 
i.mtnora1. The empathic person's deeper awareness of' the needs and feelings 
or others, and how they may be affected, may lead to greater resistance 
and, in the case of transgression, to greater remorse. This seems 
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particularly true regarding hostility. 
Anxiety and empathy appear to be negatively related. The anxious 
person is preoccupied with his own needs, fears and uncertainties; hence, 
he is less like)Jr to place himself imaginatively' in the position or the 
other. Hogan (1969), using his empathy scale and the Mlni.:rest Anxietq 
Scale, found a negative relationshi.p for medical school applicants and 
a nonsignificant relationship for college female subjects; using the 
MMPI Anxiety scale, he found a negative relationship for both groups. 
Also, Hekmat, Khajavi, and Mehryar {1975), using the empathy scale and 
the Lanton Psychological Screening Inventory, found a slight negative 
relationship for both male and female subjects. 
In the present study it was hypothesized that guilt and anxiety 
are related to empathy in different ways: guilt in a positive way, -:~ 
anxiety in a negative way. Also, a positive relationship was predicted 
between empathy and hostility guilt. 
Furthermore, empathy is positively related to differentiation, 
at least a100ng mal.e subjects (Martin & Toomey, 1973) • However, Wi tki.n 
et al. (1962) suggested that only some field-independent individuals are 
genuinely enpathic and others have a philosophical interest in values and 
lack interest in people. Perhaps empathy moderates the relationship 
between differentiation and guilt, with more empathic field-independent 
subjects being higher on guilt than less empathic ones. This possibilitu 
was explored in the present study. 
Religiosity 
In the popular mind, as Wright (1971) noted, there is an assump-
tion that religion makes people better behaved than they would be wi. thout 
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it. This ass'lU'IIPtion is probably based on people's experience with, or 
about, religion: most religions propose a roral code to guide and 
evaluate behavior; religion is frequently used to motivate behavior, to 
strengthen prohibitions, to provide sanctions; religion supports 
conventional morality. However, in the scientific mind the relationship 
between religion and morality is not so clear; the power of religious 
belief to influence behavior is a question that "remains largely 
unanswered" (Parker, 1971). 
The general impression drawn from the scientific reviews (Dittes, 
1969; Graham, 1972; Parker, 1971; Strommen, 1971; Wright, 1971) is that 
the question ultimately becomes which aspect of which type of religion 
is related to which particular moral teaching or behavior? Such an 
analysis was beyond the scope of this study. However, a religiosi ~ 
variable was included for several reasons: First, the relationship between 
religion and guilt continues to be discussed (e.g., McConahay & Hough, 
1973). Second, when religiosity is measured only by a few beliefs or 
church attendance, the results are quite limited. However, Graham (1972) 
concluded that the overall evidence suggests some relationship; he 
theorized that religion which measures firm convictions and real commitment 
may well be associated with avoidance of wrongdoing and sympathetic 
consideration for others. Third, two recent studies provide some support 
for this idea, indicating that religious affiliation and, especially, 
active involvement are associated with greater guilt proneness regarding 
sex and with less premarital sexual behavior among both male and female 
subjects (Langston, 1973; ZUckerman, Tushup, & Finner, 1976). Earlier 
investigations found similco..r results (Parker, 1971; Walters & Bradley, 
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1971). In addition, more religious subjects tended to turn their 
aggression inward, thus engaging in less hostile behavior (Bateman & 
Jensen, 1958). 
Finally, Rohrbaugh and Jessor (1975) developed a religiosity 
measure that includes not only beliefs and practices, but also personal 
experience and everyday influence. They tested the hypothesis that 
religiosity functions as a "personal control against deviant behavior. n 
They .found a network of predicted, meaningful relationships among 23 
variables to support their hypothesis with the results being stronger 
for high school seniors than for college juniors. 
In regard to anxiety, Di. ttes (1969) in a review article noted a 
general assumption that religion--especially when operationally defined 
in terms of institutional affiliation or adherence to conservative 
doctrines--is associated "torith personality deficiencies, including ''more 
desperate defenses." On the other hand, a salutary religious experience 
could, if necessary, allay anxiety and provide reassurance at least for 
those who are primarily committed to religion itself, as distinct from 
the religious institution. M:>re to the point, several factor analytic 
studies indicated that religion, whether found to be unidimensional 
(Brown, 1966) or multidimensional (Cline & Richards, 1965), is independent 
of authoritarianism and neuroticism. Furthermore, Rohrl:augh and Jessor 
(1975) found the religious person to be quite conventional, conforming, 
eschewing self-assertion, not lacking in self-esteem, not prone to a 
particular locus of control orientation, and clearly not maladapted. 
In the present study it was hypothesized that guilt and anxiety 
are related to religiosity in different ways: religiosity is positively 
related to total guilt, hostility guilt, and sex guilt; religiosity is 
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independent of anxie~. 
Hypotheses 
The primary purpose of this review of the literature was to 
propose that gUilt and anxiety can be adequately differentiated and that 
they differ in relation to differentiation, locus of control, empathy, 
and religiosity. At the same time individuals more prone to guilt are 
regarded as differing from those leas prone to gull t in identifiable 
wqs. Several hypotheses were proposed, some of them in regard to total 
guilt to facilitate comparisons w.i. th other research. In some cases the 
literature indicated the importance of sex differences. Despite the 
theoretical value of studying specific kinds of guilt, there is 
relatively little research, presumably due to the lack of adequate 
measures. As a result, the present study included a fair amount of 
exploratory research to determine and to compare the personality correlates 
of the specific kinds of guilt for male and female subjects. 
The following lzypotheses were tested: 
1. Guilt proneness and anxiety proneness are adequately 
differentiated, being either statistically independent 
or only slightly related. 
2. Anxie~ and sex guilt are positive]Jr related among 
female but not among male subjects. 
3. Field independence is poai tively related to guil.t, 
but independent of, or negatively related to, anxiety. 
4. Internal locus of control is poai ti. vely related to 
guilt among male subjects, but negative]Jr related to 
anxiety among inal.e and female subjects. 
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5. Field-independent internals are more prone to guilt 
and less prone to anxiety than the other differentiation/ 
locus of control t.ypes. 
6. Empathy is positively related to total guilt and to 
hostility guilt, but negatively related to anxiety. 
7. Religiosity is positively related to total guilt, sex 
guilt and hostility guilt, but independent of anxiety. 
CHAPTER III 
MErHOD 
SUbjects 
The subjects were 5o male and 47 female students attending a 
variety of summer courses at Ioyola University of Chicago. Most were 
undergraduates. All were volunteers; some received special credit in 
class. 
Sample characteristics: The age range tor male subjects was 18 
to 47 years with a mean age of 22.54 and a standard deviation of 4.88; 
only two subjects were over 28. The age range for female subjects was 
18 to 46 with a mean age of 22.72 years and a standard deviation of 6~~1;. 
only four subjects were over 28. 
Religious af'filia tion: Among the male subjects there were 30 
Roman Catholics, 4 Protestants, 9 "other, 11 and 7 none. Among the i'ema.le 
subjects there were 22 Roman Catholics, 5 Protestants, 15 "other, n and 
5 none. 
Race: Among the male subjects there were 45 Caucasians, no 
Negroes, 2 Orientals, and 3 "other. 11 .Anx>ng the female subjects there 
were 41 Caucasians, 3 Negroes, 1 Oriental, and 2 11other. 11 
Parochial education: Among the male subjects 31 had elementary 
or high school or both, 4 had somewhat less, and 15 had none. .Among 
female subjects 25 had elementary or high school or both, 3 had somewhat 
less, and 19 had none. 
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Measures 
Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory (Mosher, 1966, 1968): Three 
separate scales were developed to measure a personality disposition 
towards guilt in the areas of sex, hostility, and morality-conscience. 
Separate forms for male and female subjects have 79 and 78 items, 
respectively. Choices are scaled -2, -1, +1, and +2, with higher scores 
indicating greater guilt proneness. Items differentiated high- and low-
guilt groups; choices were relatively well-matched on social desirability. 
lbsher reported a multi trait-multimethod analysis of the meas'm."es 
which provided some evidence of discriminant and convergent validity, 
and indicated split-half reliabilities on the subscales between .92 and 
• 97 for male and between .76 and • 95 for female subjects. Test-retest 
stability over a 3-week period was .87 for the total guilt score (Amd~ 
& Harrow, 1972). M>sher found the scales to be independent of social. 
desirability; however, sex guilt was later found to correlate ·37 with 
social desirability (Galbraith, Hahn, & Lei berman, 1968) • Schwartz 
(1973) found the total guilt score independent of neuroticism and 
extraversion on the Maudsley Personality Inventory. 
Validity information about the individual subscales: Sex guilt 
, 
was positively correlated with Sexuality, negatively with Sex Drive and 
Interest and with Promiscuity on the Thorne Sex Inventory (Galbraith, 
1969) and negatively with Heterosexuality on the Edwards Personal 
Preference Schedule. Construct validity has been substantiated in several 
studies: High-guilt males inhibited expression of socially taooo words 
whether disapproval was likely or not, whereas low-guilt males did so only 
when disapproval, i.e., potential censure, was likely (M>sher, 1965). 
High-guilt females experienced greater state guilt after exposure to 
/ 
explicitly sexual literature (Mosher & Greenberg, 1969) or to sexual 
stimulus words (Janda & Magri, 1975). High-guilt males or females had 
less permissive standards aoout premarital sex, engaged in less intimate 
sexual behavior (Langston, 1973; Mosher & Cross, 1971), and masturbated 
less often (Abramson & Mosher, 1975) • Male sex guilt was the strongest 
predictor (e.g., stronger than stage of ooral reasoning) of the extent 
of an unmarried couple's sex experiences (D'Augelli & Cross, 1975)~ 
Hostility guilt was negatively correlated with hostility on a 
projective measure (Schill & Schneider, 1970b) and on the Buss-Durkee 
Hostility Inventory (Schill & Schneider, 1970a), was not related to self-
esteem, dogmatism, or social class, and was positively related to anxiety 
(Knott et al., 1974). Construct validity has received support in several 
studies: Low-guilt males expressed more aggressive responses during base-
line measurement, were more responsive to reinforcement for aggression, 
and less responsive to reinforcement for nonaggression, whereas high-guilt 
subjects did not respond to reinforcement for aggression (Knott et al. , 
1974). High-gull t subjects expressed less verbal hostility in a verbal 
conditioning paradigm (Mosher, 1965). High-guilt inmates committed less 
crimes against people and more against property Ot>sher & Mosher, 1966), 
and committed less crimes overall (Persons, 1970) • High-gull t females 
showed less aggression after being experimentally frustrated (Schill, 
1972b). High-guilt males expressed greater state guilt after verbal 
aggression against a victim (Okel & Mosher, 1968). 
Morality-conscience guilt ha.s been investigated in very few 
studies. !Dw-guilt males and females had a less critical attitude toward 
the use of various drugs, used a greater variety of drugs, and expressed 
..... 
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a greater likelihood of continuing to do so (Schill & Althoff, 197.5). 
Morality-conscience and hostility guilt, in combination, correlated • .5.5 
with stage of moral reasoning for delinquents (Ruma & M:>sher, 1967). 
Apparently oniy the first three stages were well represented. It was 
positively correlated with a measure of superego on the Lazare-KJ.erman 
Scale (Amdur & Harrow, 1972) • 
A copy of the Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory for men and 
the scoring key are included in the Appendix. 
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger et al., 
1970): STAI A-Trai. t scale consists of 20 statements that ask individuals 
to describe on a 4-point scale how they generally feel. Scores range 
from 20 to 80, with higher scores indicating greater proneness to anxiety. 
The STAI Manual includes normative and psychometric data for the STAI 
A-Trait Scale. Reliability information: Internal consistency is high 
with coefficient alphas ranging from .86 to .92 and test-retest coef-
ficients ranging from • 73 to .86. Validit'J information: It correlated 
from .73 to .8o with the Manifest Anxiety Scale and the Institute for 
Personality and Ability Testing Arociety Scale. Construct validity was 
supported by several studies showing predictable increases in state 
anxiety under varying conditions. Further, trait anxiety was not related 
to the various subtests of the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule, 
except for abasement; correlated positively 'With the numl:er of problems 
checked in each area on the Hooney Problem Checklist; correlated 
positive:cy with the appropriate l1MPI scales; and was not related to sex, 
intelligence, scholastic aptitude, or achievement among college students. 
Group Embedded Figures Test (01 tman, Raskin, & Witkin, 1971): 
It consists of 18 complex figures, 17 of which were taken from the 
!fTT7!SO' = 
27 
individually administered Embedded Figures Test. The Manual (Witkin et 
al., 1971) reported split-half reliability estimates of .82 for male and 
female subjects. Validity coefficients for male and female subjects, 
respectively, were as follows: -.82 and -.63 1-ti.th the individual Embedded 
Figures Test, -.39 and -.34 with the Rod and Frame Test (coefficients 
are negative for the Embedded Figures Test and Rod and Frame Test because 
of reverse scoring), • 71 and .55 with degree of oody articulation. On the 
Group Embedded Figures Test higher scorers were more field independent. 
Males scored slightly higher than females. Another study showed a 
reliabi.li ty coefficient of • 84 between the first and second h.alf for male 
subjects, and a correlation ~>lith the Rod and Frame Test of -.69 (Dumsha, 
Minard, & McWilliaJIJS, 1973). The Group :Bin bedded Figures Test is con-
sidered a satisfactory substitute for the Embedded Figures Test in 
research requiring group testing. 
Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control scale (I-E) (Rotter, 
1966): The scale consists of 29 forced-choice items, including six buffer 
items. Higher scores are more external. Major review articles by Rotter 
(1966), Lefcourt (1966, 1972), Throop and Mc!bnald (1971) and Joe (1971) 
have summarized the extensive research on locus of control which indicates 
satisfactory reliabili tv and validity. Sex differences have sometimes 
been fo1.md. 
One major critic ism of the I·· E scale is its mul tifactor structure. 
Mirels (1970) found two factors, replicated for the most part by other 
authors (Strahan & Huth, 1975). The first factor, which is similar for 
male and female subjects, includes the follo\ti.ng items from the I-E 
scale: 5, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 23, 25, 28. A copy of these items is 
\ 
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included in the Appendix. Both the I-E scale and the J.firels-like 
components were found to be statistically independent of field indepen-
dence on the Group :Embedded Figures Test (Strahan & Ruth, 1975). 
Hogan Empathy Scale (Hogan, 1969): The scale consists of 64 items, 
mostly from the California Psychological Inventory and the MMPI, which 
discriminated groups independently rated as high and low on empathy. A 
copy of the scale is included in the Appendix. Higher scores indicate 
greater empathy. Hogan (1969, 1973) reported psychometric and inter-
pretative inf'orma.tion. Test-retest stability over two months was .84. 
Estimated internal consistency was • 71. Validity information: It 
correlated .58 with social acuity, discriminated students rated high a."ld. 
low on social acuity by their teachers, predicted Q-sort empathy ratings 
with correlations ranging from .39 to .62, was positively related to 
social competence and to a factor measuring social and interpersonal 
adequacy on the California Psychological Inventory, and was not related 
to a measure of socialization. It predictably differentiated delinquents 
from nondelinquents, when both were low on socialization (Kurtines & 
Hogan, 1972), and, also, heroin addicts from collegiate marijuana users 
(Kurtines, Hogan, & Weiss, 1975). It\predictably correlated .48 and .58 
With maturity of moral judgment. It correlated negatively with 
authoritarianism and positively with ego strength. The relationship with 
intelligence was somewhat ambiguous. Female subjects scored higher than 
male. 
Measure of Religiosity (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975): The scale 
consists. of four pairs of items to operationalize Glock's four dimensions 
of religiosity, i.e., ritual, consequential, ideological, and experiential. 
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Institutional affiliation or reference to doctrines of any specific 
religion are avoided, as is an agreement response set. Items are scored 
on a 5-point scale from 0 to 4, yielding a composite score of 0 to 32 
'With high scores indicating greater religiosity. Response variance is 
broad 'With a standard deviation of approximately 8. A copy of this 
measure is included in the .Appendix. 
Rohrbaugh and Jessor (1975) showed that the psychometric 
properties of the subscales and composite were satisfactory. Internal 
consistency was high With a coefficient alpha of .90. Validit"'J 
information: A number of indications converge to provide some overall 
evidence of validity. First, it confirmed accepted data about religiosity, 
e.g., that high school students are more religious than college students -~-
\ 
and that female subjects are higher than male subjects (though not for the 
college sample). Second, multiple correlation of the subscales with a 
self-rating of religious commi ilnent was very high for all four samples. 
Third, the unidimensional score was supported qy the high intercorrelations 
of the subscales. Fourth, the subscales correlated more among themselves 
than they did with two other measures of the religious environment. 
Finally, the study, itself, provided some support for its construct 
validity as a personal control. It was not related to sex or socioeconomic 
background among the college sample. 
For the present study, the first item concerning frequency of 
attendance at religious services was modified slightly to facilitate 
"" 
scoring. It read: 
How often have you attended religious services during the past 
year? a) Never. b) A few times. c) About once a month. d) A few times 
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a month.. e) Weekly. 
Administration 
The Group Embedded Figures Test was administered in small groups, 
in some cases during class time. The other measures were handed out to 
the students and returned a few days later. Sixteen individuals did not 
finish the testing or their protocols were unusable. }bst subjects 
remained aDOl\YJDOUS; the others were guaranteed confidentiality. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The results were analyzed separately for male and female 
subjects. For the exploratory parts of this research two-tailed tests 
of significance were appropriate and their use is noted; otherwise, one-
tailed tests were used. Simple and multiple correlations are described, 
as well as certain interaction effects. A stepwise multiple-regression 
anal.ysis was performed with field independence, locus of control, empathy, 
religiosity, and age as predictor variables, and with anxiety and the four 
guilt measures as dependent variables. In this procedure the predictor.= 
variables were entered in successive steps according to which of them 
accounted for the largest amount of remaining variance in the dependent 
variable. In the following description the percentage of increase in R2 
accounted for by each predictor is noted in parenthesis. 
The means and standard deviations or all variables for roth sexes 
are presented in Table 1. No significant differences were found with t 
·tests between male and female subjects on field independence, locus of 
control, empathy, religiosity, anxiety, or age. Pearson correlations 
'-
between all personality variables are presented in Table 2 with a 
summary of the oore relevant significant correlations in Table 3. 
Anxiety 
AB lzypothesized, anxiety was found among male subjects to be 
statistically independent of the four guilt measures. Also, as 
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Table 1 
List of Variables with Means and Standard Deviations 
for Male and Female SUbjects 
11a.le Female 
(! = 5o) (!! = 47) 
Standard Standard 
Variable Mean Deviation Meari Deviation 
Field Independence 11.62 4.54 l0.64a 4-39 
!Deus of Control 8.50 3·87 9.68a 4.12 
Empathy 38.90 5.99 40.32a 5.90 
c•;!'~ 
Religiosity 15.78 9.10 16.6oa 7-99 
Anxiety 36.56 6.8o 36.7ha 8.26 
Total Guilt -7-38b 48.69 -57 .o6 37.20 
Sex Guilt -16.22° 20.02 -40.96 23.51 
Hostility Guilt 5.o8d 18.84 -4.23 13.85 
MOrality-Conscience 3.76e 17.76 -11.87 10.23 
Age 22.54 4.88 22.72a 6.51 
aNote: The difference between the male and female means was not 
significant. 
bActual range for males -84 to +98; for females -104 to +77 
c If fl II II 
-43 to +37; II II -59 to +56 
d II II II 
" 
-32 to +39; 11 II -27 to +25 
e 11 If 
" " 
-29 to +32; II 
" 
-24 to +12 
Table 2 
Correlation Matrix for All Personality Variables for Both Sexesa 
Variable 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Field Ind -o4b 23c -31 -04 -22 -32 -11 -13 -10 
2. Locus -o4d -1)+ -27 17 -38 -29 -37 -32 -50 
3· Empathy 14 -24 04 -34 -24 -30 -20 -11 13 
4. Religiosity -l~o -09 -32 -10 65 61 39 69 09 
5. Anxiety -09 22 -20 08 -11 -15 -15 01 -22 
6. Total Glti..lt 13 22 -29 28 25 9le 82e 84e 14 
1· Sex Guilt 01 17 -37 39 24 89e 64 70 1'-~ 
8. Hostility 24 oh 02 -07 02 6oe 24 48 23 
9. Mlrali ty-Con 14 35 -22 23 33 77e 62 28 -01 
10. Age -o8 02 -22 20 -03 08 19 -23 16 
~Males (li = 50) in upper right, females (! = 47) in lower left. 
:All decimals have been omitted. 
cFor males ~ < .01, one-tailed test requires ~ = .34; two-tailed, ~ = .36; 
11 n .o5, . " ,, " 11 .24; " " .28; 
dFor females 1?. < .01, one-tailed test requires ~ = .34; two-tailed, :: = .37; 
11 It .05, II II fl II .24; II II o29o 
eThese are spuriously high, part-to-whole correlations. 
It 
Table 3 
Summary of Significant Correlations Pertaining to Hypotheses 
Guilt 
Anxiety Total Sex Hostility Morality-Con. 
Field Independence 
Male -.32* 
Female .24* 
Locus of Control 
Male -.38** -.29* 
-·37** -.32* 
Female .35* 
:Empathy 
Male 
-.34** -.30* 
Female -.29* 
-·37** 
Religiosity 
Male .65*** .61*** ·39** .69*** 
Female .. 2~ 
·39** 
\.r.,) 
'*£ < .o J::""' 
**E.< .01 a 
***E.< .001 
hypothesized, anxiety was negatively related to empathy (!:_ = -.34, 
i!. < .01), and independent of field independence and religiosity. The 
h3Pothesized negative relationship between anxiety and internal locus 
of control was not supported; no relationship was found between them 
on Rotter's scale or on Mirels' Factor I. The multiple-regression 
analysis is swrma.ri.zed in Table 4. Empathy (11%), understandably, was 
the best predictor, followed tu age (3%). Together they yielded a 
multiple R of .38, which explained approxima.tely 1>% of the variance. 
Th~other variables contributed negligibly. 
\j 
For female subjects the results were slightly different. The 
h3Pothesized relationships between anxiety and guilt were supported. 
Anxiety was related in a low positive way to sex guilt (!: = .24, E. < .o>) 
and to mrali ty-conscience gull t (!:_ = • .33, E. < . 05), but was independent::: 
of total guilt and hostility guilt. The hypothesized absence of a 
relationship between anxiety and .field independence and be+-~_:. ... .,. ... -- ~-:., v;J 
and religi.osi ty was confirmed. However, the hypothesized negative 
relationships With empatby and internal locus of control were not 
supported; no relationships were .found. In the case of female anxiety, 
the overall multiple-regression analysis was not significant. 
Total Guilt 
Total guilt, as eypothesized, among male subjects was negatively 
related to locus of control on Rotter's scale (!:_ = -.38, E.< .01) and 
positively related to religiosity (!:, = .65, E.< .001). Thus, male subjects 
higher on total guilt were more internal and more religious. Jtypothesized 
positive relationships with field independence and empathy were not 
supported. The regression analysis, summarized in Table 5, indicated that 
Table 4 
Mul tip1e-Regression SUmmary for Male Anxiety 
Variable R R2 2 R change Simple !:. 
Bopatby .34 .11 .11 -.34 
Age .)8 .15a .03 -.22 
Religiosity 
·39 .15 .oo -.09 
Locus of Control 
-39 .15 .oo .16 
~2 varies slightly from the figures in the "!!:.2 change 11 
column due to rounding errors. 
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Table 5 
MUltiple-Regression Summary for Total Guilt 
R R2 2 Simple r_ 
-
!!. change 
Male 
Religiosity .65 .42 .42 .65 
Empathy .71 .5oa .07 -.24 
!Deus of Control 
-75 .56 .o6 -.38 
Field Independence .75 .56 .oo -.22 
Female 
EDpathy .29 .08 .oa -.29 
Religiosity .35 .12 .04 .28 
Field Independence .44 .20a .07 ·13 
!Deus of Control .49 .24 .o5 .22 
~2 varies slightly from the figures in the 11R2 change" 
column due to rounding errors. -
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religiosity (42%) was the best predictor, followed b.r empathy (7%), and 
locus of control (6%). The multiple ~was .75, accounting for 56% of 
the variance. 
Among female subjects total guilt was positively related to 
religiosity (!:, = .28, E.< .o5), as hypothesized, but negatively related 
to empathy (!:, = -.29, E.< .o5, two-tailed test), contrary to the 
hypothesis. The lzypothesized positive relationship with field indepen-
dence was not supported. Total guilt was not related to locus of control. 
The regression analysis, swnmarized in Table 5, indicated that empathy 
(8%) was the best predictor, followed by religiosity (4%), field 
independence (7%), and locus of control (5%). The multiple R was .49, 
explaining 24% of the variance. 
Sex Guilt 
Sex guilt, as hypothesized, among male subjects was negatively. 
related to locus of control on Rotter's scale (!:, = -.29, E.< .o5) and 
positively related to religiosity (!:, = .61, E.< .001). Contrary to the 
hypothesis, it was negatively related to field independence (!:, = -.32, 
E.< .o5, two-tailed test) and to empathy (!:, = -.30, 1?.. < .o5, two-tailed 
test). Thus, male subjects higher on sex guilt were more field indepen-
dent, more internal, less empathic, and more religious. In the regression 
analysis, summarized in Table 6, religiosity (37%) was the best predictor, ' 
followed by empathy (11%) and locus of control (3%). Together these 
yielded a multiple !! of • 71, accounting for 51% of the variance. 
Among female subjects sex guilt was positively related to 
religiosity (!:, = .39, 1?.. < .01) as hypothesized, and negatively related to 
empathy (!:, = -.37, E.< .01, two-tailed test) contrary to the hypothesis. 
.. , 
-
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Table 6 
MUltiple-Regression Summary for Sex Guilt 
R R2 ~2 change Simple !: 
Male 
Religiosity .61 
-37 -37 .61 
Empathy .69 .48 .ll -.30 
Locus of Control .71 .51 .03 -.29 
Field Independence .72 .52 .o1 -.32 
Age .72 .52 .oo .14 ._ .. 
---
Female 
Religiosity 
-39 .15 .15 ·39 
Thlpathy .47 .22 .07 
--37 
Field Independence .5o .25 .03 .01 
Locus or Control .53 .28 .03 .17 
Age .53 .28 .oo .19 
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The hypothesized positive relationship with field independence was not 
supported. No specific hypotheses were tested regarding locus of control 
and no significant relationships were found. In the regression analysis, 
s~~rized in Table 6, religiosity (15%), empathy (7%), and field 
independence (3%) yielded a multiple ~ of .So, explaining 25% of the 
variance. 
Hostility Guilt 
Hostility guilt among male subjects, as hypothesized, was 
negatively related to locus of control on Rotter's scale (~ = -.37 
E.< .01) and positively related to religiosity (! = .39, E. ( .01). 
Thus, male subjects higher on hostility guilt were more internal and 
more religious. The hypothesized positive relationships with field ;~ .. 
independence and empathy were not supported. In the regression analysis, 
summarized in Table 7, religiosity (15%), locus of control (8%), and 
empathy (7%) yielded a multiple R of .54, explaining 29% of the total 
variance. 
Among female subjects hostility guilt was positively related to 
field independence (~ = .24, E. < .o5). This was the only instance in the 
study in which the hypothesized relationship between guilt and field 
independence lias confirmed. The hypothesized positive relationships with 
empathy and religiosity were not supported. Again, there was no hypothesis 
regarding locus of control and no relationship was found. In the 
regression analysis the other variables contributed only negligibly. 
Morality-Conscience Guilt 
MOrality-conscience guilt among male subjects, as hypothesized, 
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Table 7 
11ultiple-Regression Summary for Male Hostility Guilt 
Variable R R2 R2 change Si.mple !:_ 
Religiosity .)9 .15 .15 .)9 
Locus of Control .48 .2) .08 --37 
&upatby .54 .29a .07 -.20 
Age .55 .)0 .01 .22 
Field Independence .55 .)0 .oo -.11 
~2 varies slightly from the figures in the 11R2 change" 
column due to rounding errors. 
":~ 
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was negatively related to locus of con+~ol on Rotter's scale (~ = -.32, 
1?. < .05) and positively related to religiosity (~ = .69, E.< .001); thus, 
male subjects higher on guilt were, as in previous cases, more internal. 
and more religious. In the regression analysis, summarized in Table 8, 
religiosity explained 48% of the variance with the other variables 
contributing only negligibly. 
Among female subjects the hypothesized positive relationship with 
field independence was not supported. Other possible relationships were 
explored; only the tenden<~~ for high-guilt subjects to be more external 
reached significance (on Rotter's scale ~ = • 35 and on Hirels 1 Factor I 
~ = .30; for each E.< .o5, two-tailed tests). The regression analysis, 
summarized in Table 8, indicated that external control (12%), religios¥:?1 
(7%), and field independence (8%) yielded a multiple R of .53, which 
explained 28% of the variance. 
Interaction Effects 
Possible interaction effects l::etween field independence and locus 
of control, and between field independence and empathy, were tested by 
two-way analysis of variance with three levels of each independent 
variable, and with anxiety and the four guilt measures as dependent 
variables. This was done for ooth sexes. As in previous research field 
independence and locus of control were not related for either sex. Nor 
were field independence and empathy significantly related, although there 
was a tendency for field-independent males to be more empathic. Twent,y 
separate analyses yielded only one significant interaction, namely, that 
between field independence and locus of control on Rotter's scale on 
morality-conscience guilt among female subjects, F (4, 38) = 3.46, E.< .02. 
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Table 8 
Multiple-Regression Summary for MOrality-Conscience Guilt 
R R2 -g_2 change 
Male 
Religiosity .69 .48 .48 
Empatey .70 .5o .02 
Locus of Control .12 .52 .02 
Age .73 .54 .02 
Field Independence .74 .55 .01 
Female 
Iocus of Control .35 .12 .12 
Religiosity .44 .19 .07 
Field Independence 
.53 .28a .08 
Age .54 .29a .01 
Empathy .54 .2r .oo 
~2 varies slightly from the figures in the 11R2 change" 
column due to rounding errors. 
Simple !:. 
.69 
-.11 
-.32 
.oo 
-.13 
.35 
.24 
.14 
.16 
-.22 
-·-~. 
The means and standard deviations are shown in Table 9, with the results 
of the analysis of variance in Table 10. Field-independent internals 
were hypothesized to be higher on guilt and lower on anxiety; however, 
these hypotheses were not confirmed. The field-independent external 
female group was higher on guilt than the other types. Ten additional 
analyses of variance with two levels of Mirels' Factor I yielded no 
significant interactions. 
Table 9 
Means and Standard Devia tiona for Field Independence by 
IJ:>cus of Control Analysis of Variance on Female 
MOrality-Conscience Guilt 
N Mean Standard Deviation 
Field-Ind: High 
Locus of Control 
Internals 6 -11.67 11.81 
Mi.d 5 -16.80 3-27 
Externals 4 7.75 4.03 
Field-Ind: Medium 
IJ:>cus of Control 
Internals 3 -20.00 h.oo 
1-lid 6 -14.33 8.69 
Externals 1 -15.57 10.98 
Fl.eld-Ind: IJ:>w 
Locus of Control 
Internals 5 -15.60 4-72 
Mid 6 -10.33 10.33 
Externals 5 -8.00 5.38 
<~ 
Table 10 
Field Independence by Locus of Control Analysis of Variance on 
Female Morality-Conscience Gull t 
Source of Variation elf Mean square F 
Field Independence 2 340.19 4.8~ 
Locus of Control 2 3~4.68 ~.07 
Interaction 4 242.13 3.46 
Residual 38 70.01 
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.01 
.01 
.02 
··-~ 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Anxiety proneness and guilt proneness, as hypothesized, were 
adequately differentiated f'rom each other. .Ainong male subjects the four 
guilt measures were independent of anxiety. Among female subjects there 
was a slight positive relationship between anxiety and seJr guilt, as 
hypothesized, and between arud.ety and morality-conscience guilt. The 
absence of a significant correlation among male subjects and the low 
correlation among female subjects supported the interpretation that 
guilt and anxiety are best regarded as separate constructs among normal 
subjects of' either sex. 
The present results provided clearer evidence than previous 
research that anxiety and guilt are not related among male subjects. 
Secondly, since guilt is independent of, or only minimally related to, 
anxiety, there is no support for the opinion that guilt is necessarily 
somewhat pathological. There may be some elements of fear in a guilt 
response, but that is not to say that guilt is best understood. in terms 
of a more basic fearfulness within those individuals who are relatively 
more guilt prone. At the very least, people appear to be more selective 
and more specific about their fears. Research into the object or such 
fears (e.g., authorities, God, traditional rules of institutions, loss 
of self-esteem) could be valuable. M:>re to the point, the results 
provided no argumeny against considering guilt as a possibly constructive 
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aspect of personality development. 
Field Independence 
The further attempt to relate guilt and anxiety to theoretically 
meaningful variables was only partially successful. First of all, it was 
~othesized that field independence was positively related to guilt but 
independent of, or negatively related to, an.."dety. The latter part of 
the hypothesis was confirmed l:u' the absence of a relationship between 
field independence and anxiety for both sexes. The relationship between 
field independence and guilt was more corrq:>licated, varying with sex and 
the specific kind of guilt. For example, field-independent female subjects 
were higher on hostility guilt whereas field-independent male subjects 
were lower on sex guilt. The first example confinned the initial part of 
the hypothesis while the second example was in the opposite direction. In 
fact, the first example represented the only case in which the hypothesis 
was confirmed. 
Overall, field independence was independent of anxiety and six of 
the eight guilt measures. It, therefore, provided little in the way of a 
theoretical and developmental framework for understanding guilt and anxiety 
among normal subjects. There was no support for vlitkin et a1 's. (1962) 
earlier suggestion that field-dependent individuals are more prone to 
anxiety. The present results, along with previous research (Iergel & 
Kirk, 1973; Joshi, 1974), provided solid evidence that differentiation 
and anxiety proneness are not related. Second, the results suggest that 
field-independent female subjects,who are conceptualized as having a more 
developed sense of identity and a greater tendency to label feeli:ngs 
precisely, used more constructive and socially acceptable ways of dealing 
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with their frustration, anger, and hostility. This type of theorizing, 
however, is of limited value since it is not clear why such reasons do 
not apply to other kinds of guilt~ Third, the results may provide some 
insight regarding sex guilt. Under the 11new morality" sexual ethics 
have undergone much examination and change. Inasmuch as Mosher's scale 
reflects socioconventional moral understanding, it is possible that field-
independent males adopt a less conventional moral position. The question 
for further research is whether they still have certain norms and would 
feel gull ty for violating them, although their norms in a time of ethical 
transition would be less likely to reflect the older norms of the wider 
society. 
Perhaps the conventional and uncomplicated nature of Mosher's 
scale nti..z_Wnizes the relevance of atV distinction based on field indepen-
dence and/or relatively greater complexity within the psychological 
system. In other words, field-dependent subjects are so tuned in to their 
social environment, its norms and expectations, that they have absorbed 
conventional morality, experience real guilt in that regard, and, 
therefore,~do not differ from field-independent subjects. This would also 
explain why field-dependent subjects in the Witkin et al. (1968} study 
experienced some guilt while still being more prone to shame (as opposed 
to field-independent subjects who experienced more guilt than shame) • 
'Whether field-independent subjects would be more reflective, more 
principled, more internalized, and, therefore, more guilt prone than 
field-dependent subjects on moral issues that are not part of the package 
of conventional moral wisdom is a question for future research. 
The minimal influence of field independence may reflect a 
So 
methodological problem. Some authors pointed out that a more rigorous 
testing of differentiation theory involves the use of two acceptable 
measures, in 'Which case the shared variance is then correlated with 
another variable. The present results are limited, of course, by the use 
of a single measure, the Group Embedded Figures Test. 
Locus of Control 
The second theoretical variable, thought to explain some of the 
variance in anxtety and guilt, was locus of control. Male internals were 
hypothe~ized to be higher on guilt; this was confirmed for all the guilt 
measures. Internals of both sexes were hypothesized to be lower on 
anxiety than externals; this was not confirmed but the trend was in th~::,:: 
predicted direction. Although there were no hypotheses for female subjects 
on guilt, externals were found to be higher than internals on morality-
conscience guilt. The different pattern of correlations and the contrast 
between male and female subjects on morality-conscience guilt, i.e., 
moderate relationships in opposite directions, show the importance of the 
sex variable and specific kinds of gull t. Also, locus of control provided 
some theoretical background for differentiating anxiety and guilt, at 
least for male subjects. 
The research reviewed earlier indicated that internals made a 
stronger attribution of responsibility, engaged in more self-criticism, 
were higher on resistance and remorse, and emphasized internal sanctions. 
Second, other research indicated that high-guilt subjects responded to 
personal cues rather than to surveillance or punislunent. In line with this 
description, the present results supported the interpretation tbat male 
internals manifest a personal, internalized sense of conventional moral 
responsibility. Furthermore, the present study indicates that this is 
well-founded not onlY for global measures of guilt, as employed by 
Johnson et al. (1968) and Adams-Webter (1969), but for specific kinds of 
guilt as well. The sex differences found by Johnson et al. were also 
confirmed here. It seems likely that the absence of sex differences in 
Adams-Webber's study may be due to the restricted measure e:rrq:>loyed, 
namely two projecti~e stories. A general impression from the present 
study is that guilt is too complicated to be studied with such a limited 
measure. The failure to control for sex may explain why Schwartz (1973) 
found ex~rnals higher on total guilt with a sample that included male 
and female subjects. These results may be attributable to the female 
externals who in the present study were higher on morali ty-conscierige 
guilt, with a similar but not significant trend on total guilt and sex 
guilt. At the same time, the theoretical implications of female subjects' 
scoring higher on guilt remain unclear. 
In SlUl'llDa.I"Y, the concept of internal locus of control provides 
some explanation for male guilt. Second, because the results were not 
similar for both sexes, different theoretical variables may be required 
to explain male and female guilt. Third, because the results were not 
similar for the specific kinds of guilt, different theoretical constructs 
may also be required to explain different kinds of guilt. 
The results noted above were based on Rotter's locus of control 
measure. In a further attempt to clarify the influence of locus of 
control and to overcome any masking of effects due to the multifactor 
structure of Rotter's scale, the influenc~ of Mi.rels 1 first factor, which 
refers to a feeling of mastery over the course of one's life, was also 
noted. For female subjects the pattern of' relationships was the same on 
both meas,ures. For male subjects the pattern of' correlations was different, 
with male internals being higher only on hostility guilt and not, as before, 
on all the guilt measures. Hence, with M:i..rels' measure the influence of' 
locus of' control is minimal. 
Various combinations of' field independence and locus of' control 
were analyzed, on the ass'lmlption that certain typologies are more congruent, 
that is, more psychologically consistent than others. Field-independent 
internals were hypothesized to be higher on guilt and lo't-ler on anxiety than 
the other types. Neither hypothesis was supported. The only significant 
interaction on the 3 x 3 analysis of' variance indicated that field-
independent external (i.e., an incongruent type) female subjects were ·::-:: 
higher on morality-conscience guilt. No interaction was significant with 
Mi.rels' scal.e. No theoretical explanation for this single significant 
result is apparent. Inasmuch as 30 interactions were analyzed, it may 
have been due to chance. Perhaps all that can be noted is that the recent, 
embryonic theorizing aoout consistent and inconsistent typologies has not 
led, thus far, to meaningful results about guilt and anxiety. 
A third theoretical variable, empathy, was considered. Bmpathy 
was hypothesized to be negatively related to anxiety. This was confirmed 
for male subjects and the results were in the predicted direction but 
were not significant for female subjects. Second, it 'tfas predicted that 
empathy was positively related to total guilt and to hostility guilt. 
This was not confirmed. Actually, empathy was found to be negatively 
related to sex guilt for males, and negatively related to total guilt and 
sex guilt for females. 
Empathy, then, contributed very little to the predicted 
theoretical structure explaining the difference between an_~et,r and 
guilt. The results about anxiety are similar to Hogan 1 s (1969) research, 
using the l-lanifest Anxiety Scale, and support the general illlpression that 
enpathy and adjustment are positively related. The results about guilt 
are surprising, even though restricted, for the most part, to sex guilt 
since it is the correlation wi. th sex guilt that substantially contributes 
to the significant correlation with total guilt. In retrospect, the 
socioconventional character of Mosher's scale may provide some clarifi-
cation. SUch a conventional scale implies the kind of rigid rules and 
controls characteristic of Kohl berg's stages of conventional moral :~ 
reasoning. At the same time, there is a positive relationship between 
empathy and moral reasoning (Hogan & Dickstein, 1972). One can speculate, 
therefore, that more eJ!i>athic individuals, i.e., those more sensitive to 
the effects of their behavior on others, sense an inadequacy in a morality 
of rules aoout sexual behavior and have moved beyond this 1110ral position. 
(Whether they tend to adopt a morality that says "it 1 s all right providing 
nobody is being hurt11 is another question.) The tendency of subjects high 
on sex guilt to judge moral dilemmas in terms of rigid codes and laws 
provides some support for this interpretation (D1Augelli & Cross, 1975). 
This interpretation is limited, however, in its failure to explain the 
absence of a relationship between empathy and hostility guilt. 
Religiosity 
Religiosity, as hypothesized, was not related to anxiety for 
either sex. Also, as hypothesized, it was positively related to total 
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gui.l t and sex guilt for both sexes, and to hostility guilt f'or male 
subjects. However, the hypothesized positive relationship with hosti.li ty 
guilt among female subjects was not conf'irmed. 
The absence of a relationship with anxiety supports the theory 
that "religion"--when defined operationally in terms of' interest, activity 
and experience, rather than mere af'filiation--is not related to person-
ality deficiencies. At the same time, religiosity was strongly related to 
guilt, especially among male subjects. There seem to be two explanations 
for this phenomenon, possibly complementing each other. First, the guilt 
subscales for male subjects are highly intercorrelated, e.g., .64, .70, 
and .48 (whereas the corresponding figures for the female subscales are 
much lower, i.e., .24, .62, and .28); and this occurs despite the lack~:f' 
evidence in the literature :f'or the existence of a generalized conscience. 
Hence, the similarity of the relationships, especially among the male 
subjects, may reflect, in part, a methodological bias. Second, an element 
of social conventionality characterizes the more religious person on the 
Rohrbaugh and Jessor (1975) scale, as well as the more guilty person on the 
1-bsher scale. This underlying element of' social conventionaJ.ity may help 
to explain the strong relationship between guilt and religiosity in the 
present study. 
A further difficulty in the present data, namely, the absence of 
--
a relationship between religiosity and female hostility guilt, may be 
attributable to cultural factors. In some respects society tolerates a 
greater show of aggression/hostility from men. Since more religious male 
subjects seem less prone to hostile behavior, it is possible that religious 
belief's and experience may reduce male hostility. On the other hand, women, 
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independence and empathy. Hence, their inclusion in the regression 
analysis did not provide the anticipated clarification. The nroltiple 
correlations were more valuable regarding guilt than amd.ety. When they 
were large enough to be of theoretical value, religiosity was by far the 
most substantial predictor for male subjects, while internal control and 
low empathy were of lesser value. Lastly, each female guilt variable was 
best explained by a different predictor. This indicates that either the 
choice of predictors was poor, or that there is a high degree of 
specificity in the theoretical understanding of different kinds of guilt. 
The latter suggestion complements Allinsmith's (196o) suggestion that 
internalizations in different moral areas do not necessarily have the 
same developmental origins. 
Limitations 
There are several obvious limitations to the present study: First, 
it was based upon self-reported, conscious attitudes in an admittedly 
sensitive area. Second, it has been suggested that college students, the 
subjects in this study, may sometimes adopt a position of moral relativism 
in order to .free themselves from the guilt induced during their adolescence 
by family and by society (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969).. Third, appro:xi.mately 
5o% of the subjects were Roman Catholic and many of them had a large 
amount of parochial education. Finally, any comparisons between the sexes 
were restricted by the use of different guilt measures for each sex. Be-
cause of these limi. ta tiona further corro oora tion is needed with data less 
subject to distortion (though still about specific kinds of guilt) and 
with more representative older subjects who may be more settled in their 
mral reasoning. 
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Conclusions 
This study proposed that guilt and anxiety could be adequately 
differentiated from each other and in relation to field independence, 
locus of control, empathy, and religiosity. 
1. Anxiety was adequately distinguished from total guilt and 
from the specific kinds of guilt for both sexes. 
2. Field independence was not related to anxiety for either 
sex, nor to guilt, with two exceptions: There was a 
negative relationship with male sex guilt and a positive 
one with female morality-conscience guilt. Field 
independence, as measured 1::w the Group Embedded Figures 
Test, was of little value in clarifying the concepts of 
anxiety and guilt. 
3· !Deus of control was not related to anxiety for either 
sex. Male internals were higher on all guilt variables; 
female externals were higher on morality-conscience guilt. 
!Deus of control, interpreted here as internalization of 
responsi bill ty, was of particular value in understanding 
male guilt. 
4. The notion of congruent versus incongruent field indepen-
dence/locus of control types yielded no meaningful results. 
S. Empathy was negatively related to anxiety for males but 
not for females; and negatively related to sex guilt for 
both sexes. This may indicate that more empathic 
individuals tend to move beyond rigid, conventional rules 
governing sexual behavior. 
6. Religiosity was independent of anxiety for roth sexes, but 
strongly related to guilt, especially for males. Overall, 
it was the strongest predictor of guilt, perhaps due to 
the socioconventional quality of the Mosher scales. 
7. sex differences were readily apparent. The personality 
correlates of guilt differed, at least when the guilt 
criterion differed for each sex. 
8. The personality correlates of specific kinds or guilt showed 
considerable variety. Extensive research is needed to un-
ravel this c~mplex phenomenon. 
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The generalizabili ty of these conclusions is limited b,y the use or 
a single measure or differentiation, b,y the conscious, self-report nat~! 
or the guilt data, by the construct or guilt proneness {which is distinct 
from actual resistance or actual remorse), and b,y the sample or primarily 
R01nan Catholic college students. 
This stuqy proposed that guilt proneness and anxiety proneness 
are best considered as separate constructs, and that they differ in their 
relationships with field independence, locus of control, empathy, and 
religiosity. Furthermore, it attempted to integrate the construct of 
guilt proneness into a wider theoretical network for each sex. 
Guilt proneness was conceptualized, with MOsher, as a disposition 
within specific content areas to resist temptation or, after transgression, 
to engage in self-criticism, remorse, confession or expiation; it was 
operationally defined qy the MOsher Forced-Choice Guilt Scale (MOsher, 
" --:~ 
1966, 1968) which includes separate forms for man and women, and provides 
a score for total guilt, as well as sex guilt, hostility guilt and 
morality-conscience guilt. 
The following measures were included: for anxiety proneness, the 
trait scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & 
Lushene, 1971}; for field independence, the Group Embedded Figures Test 
(Oltman, Raskin, & Witkin, 1971); for locus of control, the Rotter 
Internal-External Scale; the Hogan Enpathy Scale (Hogan, 1969); and the 
Measure of Religiosity (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975). 
The subjects were 50 male and 47 female students--mostly under-
graduates--attending summer courses as a large, private midwestern 
university. Hypotheses were tested either by Pearson correlations or by 
analysis of variance. 
The results and conclusions were, as follows: 
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1. All guilt variables for both sexes 1>rere adequately differen-
tia ted from anxiety. 
6o 
2. Field independence was not related to anxiety for either sex, 
nor to guilt, with two exceptions: There was a negative relation-
ship with male sex guilt and a positive one with female morality-
conscience guilt. Field independence proved to be of little 
value in clarifying t?-nxiety and gu:il t. 
3· !Deus of control was not related to anxiety for either sex. 
Male internals were significantly higher than externals on all 
guilt variables; female externals were higher than internals on 
morality-conscience guilt. Locus of control, interpreted here 
as internalization of responsibility, was of particular value :::.= 
in understanding male guilt. 
4. The notion of congruent versus incongruent field independence/ 
locus of control types yielded no meaningful results. 
S. Empatey was negatively related to anxiety for males but not for 
females, and negatively related to sex guilt for both sexes. 
This may indicate that more empathic individuals tend to move 
beyond rigid, conventional rules governing sexual behavior. 
6. Religiosity was independent of anxiety for both sexes, but 
strongly related to guilt, especially for males. Overall, it 
was the strongest predictor of guilt, perhaps due to the socio-
conventional quality of the Mosher scales. 
7. Sex differences were readily apparent. The personality correlates 
of guilt differed between the sexes, at least when the guilt 
criterion differed for each sex. 
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8. The personality correlates of specific kinds of guilt showed 
considerable variety. Extensive research is needed to unravel 
this complex phenomenon. 
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Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory (for Men) 
This questionnaire consists of a number of pairs of statements or 
'~ 
opinions which have been given by college men in response to the "Mosher 
Incomplete Sentences Test": These men were asked to complete phrases such 
as ''When I tell a lie • • • " and 11To kill in war • " to make a sentence 
which expressed their real feelings about the stem. This questionna.ire 
consists of the stems to which they responded and a pair of their responses 
which are lettered A and B. 
You are to read the stem and the pair of completions and decide 
which you most agree with or which is most characteristic of you. Your 
choice, in each instance, should be in terms of what you believe, how yo,y.:: 
feel, or how you would react, and not in terms of how you think you should 
believe, feel, or respond. This is not a test. There are no right or 
wrong answers. Your choices should be a description of your own personal 
beliefs, feelings, or reactions. 
In some instances you may discover that you believe both completions 
or neither completion to be characteristic of you. In such cases select 
the ~you~ strongly believe to be the case as far as you are concerned. 
Be sure to find an answer for every choice. Do not omit an i tern even 
though it is very difficult for you to decide, just select the more 
characteristic member of the pair. Encircle the letter, ! or ~' which you 
most agree with. 
1. \o!hen I tell a lie • • • 
A. it hurts. 
B. I make it a good one. 
2. To kill in war ••• 
A. is a job to be done. 
B. is a shame but sometimes a necessity. 
3 • Y.lomen who curse • • • 
A. are nonnal. 
B. make me sick. 
4. When anger builds inside me . . . 
A. I usually explode. 
B. I keep ~ mouth shut. 
5. If I killed someone in self-defense, I ••• 
A. would feel no anguish. 
B. think it would trouble me the rest of rrry life. 
6. I punish myself • • • 
A. for the evil I do. 
B• very seldom for other people do it for me. 
If in the future I committed adultery . . . 
A. I won't feel bad about it. 
B. it would be sinful. 
8. Obscene literature ••• 
A. is a sinful and corrupt business. 
B. is fascinating reading. 
9. 11Di.rty 11 jokes in mixed company • • • 
A. are common in our town. 
B. should be avoided. 
10. As a child, sex play • 
A. never entered my mind. 
B. is quite wide spread. 
11. I detest myself for • • • 
A. my sins and failures. 
B. for not having more exciting sexual experiences. 
12. Sex relations before marriage • • • 
A. ruin many a happy couple. 
B. are good in my opinion. 
13. If in the future I comrni tted adultery • 
A. I wouldn't tell anyone. 
B. I would probably feel bad about it. 
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14. 'When I have sexual desires • • • 
A. I usually try to curb them. 
B. I generally satisfy them. 
15. If I killed someone in self-defense, I ••• 
A. woul.dn' t enjoy it. 
B. I'd be glad to be alive. 
16. Unusual sex practices • • • 
A. might be interesting. 
B. don't interest me. 
17. If I felt like murdering someone • • • 
A. I would be ashamed of myself. 
B. I would try to cornm:i. t the perfect crime. 
18. If I hated my parents • • • 
A. I would hate myself. 
B. I would rebel at their every wish. 
19. After an outburst of anger • • • 
A. I usually feel quite a hi. t better. 
B. I am sorry and say so. 
20. I punish Jey"self • • • 
A. never. 
B. by feeling nervous and depressed. 
21. Prostitution • • • 
A. is a must. 
B. breeds only evil. 
22. If I killed someone in self-defense, I ••• 
A. would still be troubled by rrry conscience. 
B. would consider myself lucky. 
23. When I tell a lie ••• 
A. I'm angry with myself. 
B. I mix it with truth and serve it like a l.fartini. 
24. As a child, sex play • • • 
A. is not good for mental and emotional well being. 
B. is natural and innocent. 
25. When someone swears at me • • • 
A. I swear back. 
B. it usually bothers me even if I don't show it. 
26. When I was youneer, fighting 
A· was always a thrill. 
B. disgusted me. 
. . . 
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27. AS a child, sex play • • • 
A. was a big taboo and I was deathly af'rafd of it. 
B. was common without guilt feelings. 
28. After an argument ••• 
A. I feel mean. 
B. I am sorry f'or my actions. 
29. 11Dirty1' jokes in mixed company • • • 
A. are not proper. 
B. are exciting and amusing. 
30. Unusual sex practices • • • 
A. are awful and unthin.lmble. 
B. are not so unusual to me. 
31. 'When I have sex dreams • • • 
A. I cannot remember them in the morning. 
B. I wake up happy. 
32 • 'When I was younger, fighting • • • 
A· never appealed to me. 
B. was :fun and frequent. 
33· One should not ••• 
A. knowingly sin. 
B. try to follow absolutes. 
34. To kill in war • • • 
A· is good and meritable. 
B. would be sickerri.ng to me. 
3.5. I detest myself' f'or • • • 
A. nothing, I love life. 
B. not being more nearly perfect. 
36. 11Dirty11 jokes in mixed company ••• 
A. are lots of run. 
B. are coarse to say the least. 
31· Petting ••• 
A. is something that should be controlled. 
B. is a form of education. 
38. After an argument • • • 
A. I usually feel better. 
B. I am disgusted that I allowed myself' to become involved. 
39. Obscene literature • • • 
A. should be freely published. 
B. helps people become sexual perverts. 
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40. I regret • • • 
A. my sexual experiences. 
B. nothing I've ever done. 
41. A guilty conscience • • • 
A. does not bother me too much. 
B. is worse than a sickness to me. 
42. If I felt like murdering someone • • • 
A. it would be for good reason. 
B. I'd think I was crazy. 
43. .Arguments leave me feeling 
A. that it was a waste of time. 
B. smarter. 
44. After a childhood fight, I felt ••• 
A. miserable and made up afterwards. 
B. like a hero. 
45. 'When anger builds inside me • • • 
A· I do my best to suppress it. 
B. I have to blow off some steam. 
46. Unusual sex practices ••• 
A. are O.K. as long as they're heterosexual. 
B. usually aren't pleasurable because you have preconceived 
feelings about their being wrong. 
47. I regret ••• 
A. getting caught, but nothing else. 
B. all of my sins. 
48. 'When I tell a lie • • • 
A. rrry conscience bothers me. 
B. I wonder whether I 111 get away with it. 
49. Sex relations before marriage ••• 
A. are practiced too much to be wrong. 
B. in my opinion, should not be practiced. 
I 
5o. As a child, sex play • • • 
A. is dangerous. 
B. is not harmful but does create sexual pleasure. 
51. When caught in the act • • • 
A. I try to bluff rrry way out. 
B. truth is the best policy. 
52. As a child sex play • • • 
A. was indulged in. 
B. is immature and ridiculous. 
11 
53. When I tell a lie • • • 
A. it is an exception or rather an odd occurrence. 
B. I tell a lie. 
54. If I hated my parents ••• 
A~ I would be wrong, foolish, and feel guilty. 
B. they would know it that's for sure! 
55. If I robbed a bank • • • 
A. I would give up I suppose. 
B. I probably would get away with it. 
56. Arguments leave me feeling • • • 
A. proud, they certainly are worthwhile. 
B. depressed and disgusted. · 
57. When I have sexual desires • • • 
A. they are quite strong. 
B. I attempt to repress them. 
58. Sin and failure ••• 
A. are two situations we try to avoid. 
B. do not depress me for long. 
Sex relations before marriage • 
• • 
A. help people to adjust. 
B. should not be recommended. 
60. When anger builds inside me ••• 
A. I .feel like killing somebody. 
B. I get sick. 
61. If I robbed a bank 
A. I would live like a king. 
B. I should get caught. 
62. !~sturbation • • • 
A. is a habit that should be controlled. 
B. is very common. 
6 3. After an argument • • • 
A. I feel proud in victory and understanding in defeat. 
B. I am sorry and see no reason to stay mad. 
64. Sin and failure • • • 
A. are the works of the Devil. 
B. have not bothered me yet. 
65. If I committed a homosexual act • 
A. it would be my business. 
B. it would show weakness in me. 
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66. When anger builds inside me • • • 
A· I always express it. 
B. I usually take it out on myself. 
67. Prostitution ••• 
A. is a sign of moral decay in society. 
B. is acceptable and needed qy some people. 
68. Capital punishment • • • 
A. should be abo~i.shed. 
B. is a necessity. 
69. Sex relations before marriage ••• 
A. are O.K. if both partners are in agreement. 
B. are dangerous. 
70. I tried to make amends • • • 
A. for all rrry misdeeds, but I can't forget them. 
B. but not if I could help it. 
71. After a childhood fight, I felt • • • 
A. sorry. 
B. mad and irritable. 
72. I detest myself for • • • 
A. nothing, and only rarely dislike myself. 
B. thoughts I sometimes have. 
13· Arguments leave me feeling 
A. satisfied usually. 
B. exhausted. 
74. Masturbation ••• 
A. is all right. 
B. should not be practiced. 
75. After an argument • • • 
A. • I usually feel good if I won. 
B. it is best to apologize to clear the air. 
76. I hate • • • 
A. sin. 
B. m.oralis ts and "do gooders. n 
'\ 
77. Sex • • • 
A. is a beautiful gift of God not to be cheapened. 
B. is good and enjoyable. 
78. Capital punishment • • • 
A. is not used often enough. 
B. is legal murder, it is inhuman. 
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79. Prostitution • • • 
A. should be legalized. 
B. cannot really afford enjoyment. 
I 
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Scoring Instructions for MOsher Scale 
(MC = Morality-Conscience, H = Hostility, and S = Sex) 
1. MC A +2 16. SA -2 )l. SA +1 
B -2 B +l B -2 
2. HA -1 17. HA +2 32 •. H A +l 
B +1 B -2 B -2 
). MCA -l 18. HA +2 33· MC A +2 
B +2 B -2 B -2 
4. HA -2 19. HA -1 34- HA· -2 
B +1 B +2 B +2 
>· HA -1 20. MC A -2 35. MCA -2 
B +2 B +2 B +2 
6. MC A +2 21. SA -2 )6. SA -2 
B -2 B +2 B +l 
.... ...., 
7- SA -2 22. HA +2 37. SA +1 
B +2 B -2 B -l 
8. MCA +2 2). MC A +2 38. HA -l 
B -2 B -2 B +2 
9· SA -l 24. SA +2 39. I~ A -2 
B +1 B -2 B +2 
lO. SA +1 25. HA -2 40. MC A +2 
B -1 B +1 B -2 
11. MC A +2 26. HA -2 41. MC A -1 
B -2 B +2 B +2 
12. SA +2 27. SA +2 42. HA -1 
B -2 B -2 B +2 
1). SA -1 28. HA -2 43· HA +1 
B +1 B +2 B -l 
14. SA +l 29. SA +1 44. HA +2 
B -2 B -2 B -2 
15. HA +1 )0. SA +2 45. HA +2 
B -2 B -2 B -l 
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46. SA -1 62. SA +1 78. HA -2 
B +1 B -1 B +2 
47. MCA -2 6). HA -1 19· SA -1 
B +2 B +1 B +1 
48. MC A +2 64. MC A +2 
B -2 B -2 
49. SA -1 65. SA -1 
B +1 B +1 
5o. SA +2 66. HA -2 
B -2 B +2 
51. MC A -2 67. SA +2 
B +1 B -2 
52. SA -1 68. HA +1 
B +1 B -1 
53. MC A +1 69. SA -2 
B -1 B +2 
---
54. HA +2 70. MCA +2 ---
B -2 B -2 
55. MC A +1 71. HA +1 
B -2 B -2 
56. HA -2 72. MC A -1 
B +2 B +2 
\ 
57. SA -2 73· HA -1 
B +1 B +1 
58. MCA +1 74· SA -1 
B -1 B +1 
59. SA -2 75. HA -1 
B +1 B +2 
6o. HA -2 76. HA +2 
B +2 B -2 
61. MC A -2 77. SA +1 
B +2 B -2 
5-
10. 
11. 
15. 
16. 
18. 
23. 
25. 
28. 
Items of the Rotter I-E Scale Scored for Mirels 1 Factor I 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense. 
Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades 
are influenced b.1 accidental happenings. 
In the case of the well-prepared student there is rarely if 
ever such a thing as an unfair test. 
Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course 
work that studying is really useless. 
Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little 
or nothing to do with it. 
Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place 
at the right time. \ 
In rrry case getting what I want has little or nothing to do 
with luck. 
Many times we might just as well decide what to do b.1 fiipping 
a coin. 
Who gets to be the ooss often depends on who was lucky enoug_l)._ 
to be in the right place first. 
Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, 
luck has little or nothing to do with it. 
Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are 
controlled b,y accidental happenings. 
There is really no such thing as "luck." 
Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades 
they give. 
There is a dire~t connection between how hard I study and the 
grades I get. 
Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things 
that happen to me. 
It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays 
an important role in my life. 
'Wha. t happens to me is rrry own doing. 
Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the 
direction my life is taking. 
Note: The underlined alternative is scored in the external direction. 
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Hogan Empathy Scale 
(Answers scored for empathy are noted in parentheses.} 
1. A person needs to "show off" a little now and then. (T} 
2. I liked "Alice in Wonderland" by Lewis Carroll. (T) 
3· Clever, sarcastic people make me feel very uncomfortable. (F) 
4. I usually take an active part in the entertainment at parties. (T) 
5. I feel sure that there is only one true religion. (F) 
6. I am afraid of deep water. (F) 
7. I must admit I often try to get my own way regardless of what others 
may want. (F) 
8. I have at one time or another in nw life tried my hand at poetry 
writing. (T) - --~~- -· 
9· Most of the arguments or quarrels I get into are over matters of 
principle. (T) 
10. I would like the job of foreign correspondent for a newspaper. (T) 
11. People today have forgotten how to feel properly ashamed of them-
selves. (F) 
12. I prefer a shower to a bathtub. (T) 
13. I always try to consider the other fellow's feelings before I do 
something. (T) 
14. I usually don 1 t like to talk much unless I am with people I know 
very well. (F) 
15. I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something. {T) 
16. I like to keep people guessing what I'm going to do next. (F) 
17. Pefore I do something I try to consider how my friends will react to 
it. (T} 
18. I like to talk before groups of people. (T) 
19. l.Jhen a man is with a woman he is usually thinking about things 
related to her sex. (F) 
20. Only a fool would try to change our American way of life. (F) 
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21. }oty parents lvere always very strict and stern with me. (F) 
22. Sometimes I rather enjoy going against the rules and doing things 
I'm not supposed to do. {T) 
23. I think I would like to belong to a singing club. (T) 
24. I think I am usually a leader in my group. (T) 
25. I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place. 
(F) 
26. I don't like to work on a problem unless there is the possibility 
or coming out with a clear-cut non-ambiguous answer. (F) 
27. It oothers me when something unexpected interrupts my daily 
routine. {F) 
28. I have a natural talent for influencing people. {T) 
29. I don't really care whether people like me or dislike me. (F) 
30. The trouble with many people is that they don't take things seT:heusly 
enough. (F) 
31. It is hard for me just to sit still and relax. {F) 
32. Once in a while I think of things too bad to talk about. (F) 
33· I feel that it is certainly best to keep my mouth shut when I'm in 
trouble. (F) 
34. I am a good mixer. (T) 
35· I am an important person. (F) 
36. I like poetry. (T) 
37. }tr feelings are not easily hurt. (F) 
38. I have met problems so full of possibilities that I have been unable 
• to make up my mind about them. {T) 
39· Often I can't understand why I have been so cross and grouchy. {F) 
40. What others think of me does not bother me. (F) 
41. I would like to be a journalist. (T) 
42. I like to talk about sex. (T) 
43· Jtr way of doing things is apt to be mis\Ulderstood by others· {F) 
86 
44. Sometimes without any reason or even when things are going wrong I 
feel excitedly happy, "on top of the world. 11 (T) 
4.5. I like to be with a crowd who play jokes on one another. (T) 
46. t-ty mother or father often made me obey even when I thought that it 
was unreasonable. (F) 
47· I easily become impatient with people. (F). 
48. Sometimes I enjoy hurting persons I love. (T) 
49. I tend to be interested in several different hobbies rather than to 
stick to one of them for a long time. {T) 
.5o. I am not easily angered. (T) 
.51. People have often misunderstood IIT'J intentions when I was trying to 
put them right and be helpful. {F) 
I am usually calm and not easily upset. (T) 
I would certainly enjoy beating a crook at his own game. (T) 
I am often so annoyed '\-Then someone tries to get ahead of me in a 
line of people that I speak to him about it. (F) 
.5.5. I used to like hopscotch. (F) 
56. I have never ooen made especially nervous over trouble that arry 
members of my family have gotten into. (F) 
57· As a rule I have little difficulty in "putting rnyself into other 
people's shoes. 11 (T) 
.58. I have seen some things so sad that I almost felt like crying. (T) 
59· Disobedience to the government is never justified. (F) 
6o. It is the duty of a citizen to support his countr'IJ, right or wrong. 
(F) 
61. I am usually rather short-tempered with people who come around and 
bother me with foolish questions. (F) 
62. I have a pretty clear idea of what I would try to impart to rrry 
students if I were a teacher. (T) 
63. I enjoy the company of strong-willed people. (T) 
64. I frequently undertake more than I can accomplish. (T) 
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Measure of Religiosi ~ 
1. How often have you attended religious services during the past year? 
a) Never. 
b) A few times. 
c) About once a month. 
d) A few times a month. 
e) Weekly. 
2. Which or the following best describes your practice or prayer or 
religious meditation? 
a) Prayer is a regular part of my daily life. 
b) I usually pray in times of stress or need but rarely 
at any other time. 
c) I pray only during formal ceremonies. 
d) Prayer has little importance in my life. 
e) I never pray. 
3. When you have a serious personal problem how often do you take 
religious advice or teaching into consideration? 
a) .Alinost always. 
b) Usually. 
c} Sometimes. 
d) Rarely. 
e) Never. 
---
-· 
4. How much of an influence would you say that religion has on the way 
that you choose to act and the way that you choose to spend your 
time each day? 
a} No influence. 
b) A small influence. 
c} Some influence. 
d) A fair amount of influence. 
e) A large influence. 
5. Which of the following statements comes closest to your belief about 
God? 
a} 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 
I am sure that God really exists and that He is active in 
rrry life. 
Although I sometimes question His existence, I do believe 
in God and believe He knows of me as a person. 
I don't know if there is a personal God, but I do believe 
in a higher power of some kind. 
I don't know if there is a personal God or a higher power 
of some kind, and I don't know if I will ever know. 
I don't believe in a personal God or in a higher power. 
6. whlch of the following statements comes closest to your belief about 
life after death (i.mmortali ty)? 
a} I believe in a personal life after death, a soul existing as 
a specific individual. 
b) I believe in a soul existing after \death as a part of a 
universal spirit. 
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c) I believe in a life after death of some kind, but I really 
don 1 t know what it would be like. 
d) I don 1 t know whether there is any kind of life after death, 
and I don 1 t know if I will ever know. 
e) I don't believe in any kind of life after death. 
1· During the past year, how often have you experienced a feeling of 
8. 
religious reverence or devotion? 
a) Almost daily. 
b) Frequently. 
c) Sometimes. 
d) Rarely. 
e) Never. 
D:> you agree with the following statement? "Religion gives me a 
great amount of comfort and security in life. 11 
a) Strongly disagree. 
b) Disagree. 
c) Uncertain. 
d) Agree. 
e) Strongly agree. 
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